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FREDERICK SCHAUER 
"PRIVATE" SPEECH AND THE 
"PRIVATE" FORUM: GIVHAN v. 
\VESTERN LINE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Short opinions, like "great" cases and "hard" cases/ often make 
bad law. A satisfactory judicial opinion need not be long. Concise 
prose and direct analysis are admirable if frequently ignored judi-
cial virtues. They are not necessarily to be found in shan opinions. 
Constitutional adjudication, particularly by the Supreme Coun, 
must to some extent be both prospective and advisory, anticipating 
problems to which the announced principles will be applied. No 
amount of academic prattle about holdings, dicta, and ratio de-
cidendi can dispel the fact that, in couns other than the Supreme 
Court, the law is what the Supreme Coun says by its words as much 
as it is what the Coun holds by its decisions. If the Coun were to 
say that two plus two equals five, as it so frequently does, then for the 
lower courts two plus two equals five, even when that assertion by 
the Court was unnecessary to its decision. Thus, brevity may be a 
judicial vice when it results in the pronouncement of broad prin-
Frederick Schauer is Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, College of William and Mary. 
The author is grateful for the assistance of Tom Collins, Mary Jane Morrison, 
and Doug Rendleman, all of wl!om provided cogent criticisms of an earlier draft 
of this article. 
1 "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law." Northern Securities Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S.197, 400 (1904) {Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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ciples that are unqualified and unjustified. When explanation and 
qualification are lacking, the words of the Supreme Court may be 
used to support results neither intended by the Court nor covered 
by an inadeqpate rationale underlying the opinion.2 
A recent example of this phenomenon is the Supreme Court's de-
cision last Term in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District.3 In that case, a junior high school teacher had on numerous 
occasions complained to her principal, in the principal's office, about 
alleged racial discrimination in the school. These complaints an-
tagonized the principal, and the teacher's contract was not renewed. 
The district court held that the dismissal violated the First Amend-
ment.4 The Fifth Circuit reversed that judgment, ruling that "pri-
vate" speech such as that involved here was wholly outside the First 
Amendment.5 A unanimous Supreme Court needed only a few 
pages to reject the Fifth Circuit's view of the First Amendment as 
"erroneous."6 The Court held that the teacher's statements to the 
principal in his office could not, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, be used to justify the teacher's dismissal. Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, speaking for the Court, rejected any distinction between pri-
vate and public speech, finding such a distinction supported neither 
by the words of the First Amendment nor by any of the Court's free 
speech cases. 
There are difficult issues involved in the contrast between speech 
in a public forum and speech in private conversation, as well as in 
the extent to which the First Amendment protects a public employee 
who communicates his or her views on the employer's time and 
on the employer's premises. The complexity of these problems is 
2 The paradigm is perhaps Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (194-2). There a 
"casual, almost offhand" (Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 4-98, 514 [1959] 
[Douglas, ]., concurring]), statement of the commercial speech exception to the 
First Amendment established a principle that survh·ed for twenty-four years, until 
its demise in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council,425U.S.748 (1976). 
3 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979). 
4 Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 404 F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. 
Miss. 1975). This opinion deals only with damages, interest, and attorneys' fees. 
Judge Smith's prior ruling on the merits is unreported. 
5 Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 555 F.2d 1309. (5th Cir. 
1977). 
6 99 S. Ct. at 695. 
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clouded more than it is illuminated by the Court's conclusory opin-
ion in Givhan. 
1. THE GIVHAN CASE 
A. HISTORY 
From 1963 until1971 Bessie Givhan served as a junior high school 
teacher in three different schools in the Western Line Consolidated 
School District, which encompassed part of two counties near 
Greenville, Mississippi. 7 The school district lacked a tenure sys-
tem, and she was employed under a series of one-year contracts. 
During this period, race relations was a subject of considerable 
significance and controversy both in the community and in the 
schools in which Bessie Givhan taught. Since 1969 the schools in 
the district had been operating under a desegregation order issued 
by the district court pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sin-
gleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District.8 
On frequent occasions during the 1970-71 school year Givhan 
objected to various practices within the school. Primarily, she con-
tended that racial segregation existed in the appointment and assign-
ment of nonprofessional employees such as administrative and cler-
ical staff and lunchroom workers.9 These objections were presented 
to the principal, Leach, in his office. Some complaints were pre-
sented orally and others in writing; all were characterized by Givhan 
as "requests" and by Leach as "demands."10 
In 1971 Givhan was informed that she would not be rehired for 
the following academic year. In making that decision, the superin-
tendent of schools had followed Leach's recommendation, which 
read in part as follows: 11 
7 The Supreme Court's statement of the facts is elliptical. The facts here are 
derived from the Supreme Court opinion, the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, note 5 
S11PT<7, the opinion on remedies of the district court, note 4 S11pra, and the unpub-
lished district court opinion on the merits, Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, 
at 27a. 
R419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded S1lb nom. Carter v. West 
Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970), on remand, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
9 555 F.2d at 1314. 
10 Id. at 1313. 11 I d. at 1312. 
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Ms. Givhan is a competent teacher, however, on many oc-
casions she has taken an insulting and hostile attitude towards 
me and other administrators. She hampers my job greatly by 
making petty and unreasonable demands. She is overly critical 
for a reasonable working relationship to exist between us. She 
also refused to give achievement tests to her homeroom stu-
dents. 
[1979 
Givhan sued the school district, alleging that her dismissal was 
impermissibly motivated by and based on her complaints to Leach, 
conduct she claimed was protected by the First Amendment. The 
district court agreed, finding that "the school district's motivation 
in failing to renew Givhan's contract was almost entirely a desire to 
rid themselves of a vocal critic of the district's policies and prac-
tices which were capable of interpretation as embodying racial dis-
crimination."12 
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals did not find it 
necessary to consider the balancing analysis for speech by public 
employees mandated by Pickering v. Board of Educati01113 and 
Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle.14 In Pickering the Su-
preme Court held that a teacher could not be dismissed on the basis 
of a letter to the editor of a local newspaper in which the teacher 
criticized the board of education.15 As long as the public expression 
by a teacher was not intentionally false, 16 the speech was presump-
tively protected, although it remained necessary to balance the free 
speech rights involved against the interests of the school as em-
ployer in preserving close working relationships, confidentiality, and 
professional competenceP In 1977 the Court held in Mt. Healthy 
12 !d. at 1314, quoting the unreported opinion of the district court. 
13 391 u.s. 563 (1968). 14 429 u.s. 274 (1977). 
15 Pickering had sent a letter to a local newspaper in connection with a proposed 
tax increase. The letter was critical of the way that both the board of education 
and the superintendent of schools had handled previous revenue proposals. He was 
dismissed because his letter was found to be "detrimental to the efficient operation 
and administration of the schools of the district." 391 U.S. at 564. 
16 Pickering specifically adopted the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 391 U.S. at 573-74. 
17 391 U.S. at 568-72. The Court in Pickering did little more than hint at ways 
in which other cases might be differently decided if the speech were different or 
the nature of the relationship were different. One commentator has gleaned from 
the Pickering opinion fourteen different factors that go into the balance. Zillman, 
Free Speech and Military Conrmand, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 423, 450-51. On Pickering 
generally, see Van Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of Teacbers and Professors, 
1970 DuKE L.J. 841, 848-54. 
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that, where a teacher had been dismissed on the basis of the kinds of 
statements held protected in Pickering, the dismissal could still be 
upheld if the school board could demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have dismissed the teacher even in the 
absence of the protected expression.18 
The Fifth Circuit did not apply this balancing analysis because it 
did not find Givhan's actions covered in any way by the First 
Amendment. Pickering and Mt. Healthy come into play only when 
the teacher has engaged in First Amendment conduct and when 
that conduct has played a part in the dismissal. If no First Amend-
ment conduct is involved, then the Pickering-Mt. Healthy issues 
are never reached. The Fifth Circuit disposed of the case at this 
threshold stage: 19 
The strong implication of [Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and Perry 
v. Sindermamz20 l is that private expression by a public em-
ployee is not constitutionally protected .... Neither a teacher 
nor a citizen has a constitutional right to single out a public 
employee to serve as the audience for his or her privately ex-
pressed views, at least in the absence of evidence that the public 
employee was given that task by law, custom, or school board 
decision. 
The Fifth Circuit's decision is thus based on two distinct but re-
lated grounds. First, speech in the "private forum" is not covered 
by the First Amendment. Second, the First Amendment does not 
protect the speaker who forces his views on an unwilling listener. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
The Supreme Court found Givhan an easy case. The Fifth Circuit 
had made an obvious and fundamental error in First Amendment 
doctrine. For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist said that 
it was mistaken to view the activity in question as outside the scope 
1
"429 U.S. at 287. The burden shifts to the school board after the teacher has 
met the burden of showing that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct 
and that that conduct was a "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" in the de-
cision to dismiss or not to rehire. Ibid. The relevant conduct in Mt. Healthy was a 
telephone call to a radio station. I d. at 281-84. 
10 555 F.2d at 1318-19. 
20 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry is best known as the procedural due process case 
dealing with de facto tenure. The opinion also makes it clear, however, that Picker-
ing applies to the decision not to retain a nontenured teacher. ld. at 598. 
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of the First Amendment merely because it occurred in the prin-
cipal's private office. Although the speech in Pickering, Perry, and 
Mt. Healthy had indeed taken place in the public forum, the fact of 
the public forum was irrelevant to the holdings in those cases.21 And 
once the distinction between Givhan's complaints in the principal's 
office and Pickering's letter to a newspaper is removed, Bessie 
Givhan's case falls squarely within the principles of Pickering and 
Mt. Healthy :1.2 The dismissal can then only be sustained if the 
school board can involve one of the special justifying reasons found 
in Pickering,23 or if the school board can demonstrate by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have dismissed her even 
in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct. The 
Court's opinion very strongly suggests that, as to the quality of the 
speech justifying removal, the result must be the same as in Picker-
21 
"This Court's decisions in Pickering, Perry, and Mt. Healtby do not support 
the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental 
abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately 
rather than publicly. While those cases each arose in the context of a public em-
ployee's public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on 
that largely coincidental fact." 99 S. Ct. at 695-96. 
22 In holding that Pickering protection was not lost by the private or personal 
or limited nature of the speech, Givban was consistent with virtually all lower 
court decisions addressing this issue. The most extensive discussion is in Pilkington 
v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465 (D.R.I. 1977). "Certainly his criticisms do not lose 
the protection of the First Amendment by reason of their being prudently di-
rected to his co-employees and superiors ... instead of to the public at large." 
ld. at 474-75. See also ]annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.4 (4th Cir. 1974); 
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 493 n.13 (7th 
Cir. 1972); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 338 (lOth Cir. 1973); Ring v. Schlesinger, 
502 F.2d 479,489 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Downs v. Conway School District, 328 F. Supp. 
338 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80, 87-88 (W.D. Va. 1975); 
Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. Va. 1977). The strongest precedent 
for the Fifth Circuit's exclusion of private speech is Roseman v. Indiana University 
of Pennsylvania, 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1975). Some of the foregoing cases 
dealt with private complaints quite similar to those in Givban. Others dealt with 
the circulation of petitions or complaints among a number of colleagues. \Vhile 
neither is fully public, the latter seems clearly more so. See Rosado v. Santiago, 562 
F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding the circulation of a letter among colleagues to 
be protected speech, but specifically reserving the issue of whether a purely private 
letter to one's superior is protected). 
23 See note 17 supra. Among the most important of these reasons, as suggested 
in Pickering, are a particular threat to internal discipline, 391 U.S. at 569; a par-
ticular threat to harmony among co-workers, ibid.; Jeopardizing a close working 
relationship with an immediate superior, id. at 570; presen•ing a special need for 
confidentiality, id. at 570 n.3, 572; or statements "so without foundation" as to call 
into question a teacher's fimess for the position, id. at 573 n.5. 
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ing, where none of the proffered justifications were found accept-
able.24 But as to the second factor-independent grounds for dismis-
sal-the record was less clear. The case had been tried in the district 
court before Aft. H eaftfjy was decided, and thus the school board 
had neither reason nor opportunity to attempt to prove that it would 
not have rehired Givhan even without the presence of the constitu-
tionally protected criticism. The Supreme Court therefore remanded 
the case so that the district court could make the appropriate .find-
ings on this aspect of the i}lt. Healtby analysis.25 
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that 
the principal was a captive and unwilling audience. "Having opened 
his office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position 
to argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views."26 The 
reversal on this point is almost wholly factual. Nothing in the Court's 
opinion suggests any expansion of the very limited circumstances 
in which the presence of an unwilling audience diminishes the ex-
tent of free speech protection. Coben v. California21 and Erznoznik 
v. Jacksonville28 emerge untouched,29 and so do Rowan v. Post 
~4 In commenting on the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that Givhan's 
statements may have jeopardized a close working relationship with her immediate 
superior, the principal, the Court said that "we do not feel confident that the 
Courts of Appeals' decision would have been placed on that ground notwith-
standing its VIew that the First Amendment docs not require the same sort of 
Pickering balancing for the prh·ate expression of a public employee as it docs for 
public expression." 99 S. Ct. at 696 (footnote omitted). 
~:;Givhan had allegedly engaged in several acts of insubordination not involving 
First Amendment questions, such as a refusal to give certain standardized tests to 
her students. 99 S. Ct. at 694 n.l, 695 n.2. The Court's opinion suggests that some 
of these acts, if substantiated, might support a finding that she would not have 
been rehired e\•cn were it not for the complaints. ld. at 697 n.5. The brief con-
curring opinion of l\Ir. Justice Stc,·ens, directed solely to this point, takes the posi-
tion that the previous proceedings most likely preclude a successful Mt. Healthy 
claim by the school board. ld. at 697-98. 
~1 99 S. Ct. at 696. 
21403 U.S.15 (1971). 28 422 U.S.205 (1975). 
2r' Er:::noznik had to some extent been qualified by Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Sec Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: Tbe 
Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Theaters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 
(1977); Schauer, Tbe Ret11m of Variable Obscenity? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977). 
And both Coben and Ermoznik were called into question on this point by the 
Court's reliance on captive audience reasoning in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 
438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court in Pacifica suggested that the distinction may turn 
on whether the speech takes place inside or outside the home, id. at 732 n.5. But 
by specifically referring to a "balance between the offensive speaker and the unwill-
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Office Departmenf3° and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.31 
The Conn did say that time, place, and manner restrictions on 
teacher complaints would be permissible and that a violation of such 
restrictions by a teacher could constitutionally be cause for dis-
missaJ.32 In this sense Givhan is based upon impermissible content 
regulation,33 as were both Erznoznik and Chicago Police Depart-
ment v. Mosley.34 Just as Mosley suggests that a content-neutral 
prohibition on speech near a school would be permissible, so too 
does Givhan suggest that the principal could limit the access of 
teachers to his office.35 Only by opening his office to complaints 
and then basing his action on the substance of those complaints did 
the principal run afoul of the First Amendment.36 The most relevant 
ing audience," ibid. the Court left the entire area of offensive speech and intrusive 
speech wide open for further development and clarification. Compare Feinberg, 
Pornography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. PnT. L. REv. 567 (1979), witb Schauer, 
Pornograpby and the First Amendment, 40 U. PnT. L. REv. 605 (1979); see also 
Haiman, Speecb v. Privacy: Is Tbere a Right Not to Be spoken To? 67 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 153 (1972); Kaufman, Tbe Medium, tbe Message and the First Amendment, 
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1970); Rutzick, Offensive Language and tbe Evolution of 
First Amendment Pro~ection, 9 HARV. Crv. RTs. Crv. Lm. L. REv. I (!974). 
30 397 u.s. 728 (1970). 
31418 U.S. 298 (1974). As with Coben and Erznoznik, the validity of Lebman 
may be in question on other grounds. Lebman is not a content regulation case 
only because commercial advertising was not in 1974 held to be within the First 
Amendment. Thus, the creation of a forum for commercial advertising would 
not then be considered to be the creation of a public forum in First Amendment 
terms. But if, as is now the case, commercial advertising is within the First Amend-
ment, it may not be possible to avoid creating a public forum by accepting com-
mercial material. 
32 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4. 
33 See TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 672-74 (1978); Karst, Equality 
as a Central Principle in tbe First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1976). 
34 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
The virtually unqualified abhorrence of content regulation in Mosley (sec Karst, 
note 33 supra) seems now in decline, a development primarily the product of Mr. 
Justice Ste\·en's opinions in Young and Pacifica. This in turn seems consistent with 
Mr. Justice Stevens's flexible approach to constitutional adjudication that eschews 
distinct categories, rigid rules, and unqualified doctrines. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). It is theoretically possible that 
distinguishing among forms of speech will increase the amount of First Amend-
ment protection. Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. 
L. REv. 157, 181 (1977). But the results in Pacifica and Young belie such as possibility. 
35 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4. 
36 A school principal who said that his office was off limits might be on safe 
constitutional ground. But a principal who totally eliminated access of any kind, by 
teachers or parents, might be in difficulty under the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
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precedent on this point may be Southeastern Pro111otions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad.37 Chattanooga need not build a civic center, and thus need 
not create this particular forum for speech. But having done so it 
must treat all speech equally. So too must Leach, having created 
this forum by opening his office door, treat all speech equally. The 
complainer may not be fired while the apple-polisher is promoted. 
A principal could still under some circumstances base a decision, 
including a termination decision, on what is said in his office. As 
with the teacher who speaks out in public, the teacher who speaks 
out in the principal's office is still a teacher. The Pickering balancing 
approach rather than the more absolute principles of Mosley pro-
vides the framework for the analysis. The principal's voluntary 
action in opening his office turns the office into the equivalent of 
a public forum, but it does not remove Givhan's status as a teacher. 
It does not therefore diminish the extent to which under Pickering 
a teacher may still be disciplined or dismissed for speaking out.38 
This approach works, however, only if the forum so created is 
indeed a First Amendment forum, notwithstanding its cloistered 
location and notwithstanding that the public at large not only was 
not invited, but also would not have been permitted entrance. Here 
the Court relies on its rejection of the distinction between public 
and private speech. Givhan argued that a complaining teacher might 
be more prudent in voicing her complaints in the principal's office 
than in public. It would be anomalous, she claimed, if the more 
prudent action could result in less constitutional protection. 39 This 
argument appears to have helped persuade the Court that a distinc-
tion between public and. private speech is untenable. 
C. A NOVEL SOURCE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
My initial remarks about the brevity of the opinion in Givhan 
were prompted not so much by the length of the entire opinion as 
by the fact that the discussion of the distinction between public 
speech and private speech is contained in only three sentences: 40 
37 420 U.S. 546 (1975). See Karst, Public Enterprise cmd the Public FoTUm: A 
Comme11t 011 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHio ST. L.J. 247 (1976). 
3
" See text supra, at notes 17 and 23. 
3~ Brieffor Petitioner, at 16-17. 
40 99 S. Ct. at 696-97. 
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The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the "freedom 
of speech." Neither the amendment itself nor our decisions indi-
cate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who ar-
ranges to communicate privately with his employer rather 
than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt 
such a view of the First Amendment. 
[1979 
That is it. Nothing about why private communications falls into 
the same category as spreading one's views before the public, with 
the exception of one rather unusual source for First Amendment 
doctrine. The Court looked at and relied on the text of the First 
Amendment! 41 In the past the text has hardly been a popular source 
for free speech methodology. Of course, most of our First Amend-
ment doctrine is based on the very strong wording of that amend-
ment, but it is rarely suggested that the amendment gives much 
guidance to its application in hard cases.42 For that heretofore we 
have looked elsewhere. 
The Court here uses the text to say that a particular distinction 
is untenable. The distinction between public speech and private 
speech is indeed not suggested by the words "freedom of speech." 
But neither is the distinction between commercial speech and po-
41 Mr. Justice Rehnquist's punctuation is intriguing to those of us who labor under 
the handicap of an exposure to linguistic philosophy. Note that the opinion places 
the quotation marks after the word "the," although the words in the First Amend-
ment are "the freedom of speech," not "freedom of speech." The inclusion of the 
word "the" allows a wider range of interpretation than would the words "freedom 
of speech" standing alone. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the distinction 
between public speech and private speech is not supported by the text is buttressed 
by his selective extraction of relevant words. Moreover, even the phrase "freedom 
of speech" standing alone is far from clear and far from absolute. Sec Schauer, 
Speecb and "Speecb": Obscenity and "Obscenity"-an Exercise in tbe Interpreta-
tion of Constitlltional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979); Note, Tbe Speecl• mzd 
Press Clause of tbe First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARV. L. REv. 374 
(1973). 
42 Neither of the two most prominent textual arguments has prevailed. The first 
is the Douglas-Black argument for an absolute interpretation of the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). The other is the textual argument for special protection for the press. See 
Lange, Tbe Speecb and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, 
Introduction-Is Freedom of tbe Press a Redundancy: JVbat Does It Add to Free-
dom of Speecb?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639 (1975); Nimmer, Speecb and Press: A Brief 
Reply, 23 U.C.L.A. REv. 120 (1975); Stewart, "Or of tbe Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
631 (1975); Van Alstyne, Tbe Hazards to tbe Press of Claiming a "Preferred Posi-
tion," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); see also First National Bank v. Bellotti', 435 U.S. 
765 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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litical speech/3 the distinction between defamatory speech and non-
defamatory speech,44 the distinction between the broadcast media 
and other forms of communication,45 or the distinction between 
public figures and private individuals/6 all distinctions well estab-
lished in contemporary free speech doctrine. The text tells us only 
that the distinction between public speech and private speech is 
not supported by the wording of the text. It does not tell us that 
the distinction cannot be found in history, in the intent of the draft-
ers, in the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of freedom 
of speech, or in the vast realm of constitutional policy. If textual 
silence regarding a distinction mandates rejection of that distinc-
tion, then free speech theory is in need of a major overhaul. And 
if textual silence is not dispositive, then we need to know why the 
other sources of First Amendment doctrine do not either com-
mand or support this distinction, an inquiry totally absent from the 
reasoning in Givhan. 
D. A QUESTION OF COVERAGE 
The treatment of private speech by the Court becomes more un-
derstandable upon closer examination of the opinion of the Fifth 
Circuit. The Court of Appeals did not say that Bessie Givhan's 
words were not protected by the First Amendment. It said that her 
words were not even covered by the First Amendment.47 
This distinction between coverage and protection is of major im-
portance in First Amendment theory.48 There are some activities 
43 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
n.24 (1976). See Schiro, Connnercial Speecb: Tbe Demise of a Cbimera, 1976 
SuPREME CouRT REVIEW 45. 
44 Gertz v. Robert \Velch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
4
"F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v.F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
46 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
·l7 The point is highlighted by the concurring opinion of Judge Roney, in which 
he agreed that the error was in even "casting this case in the First Amendment 
terms." 555 F.2d at 1322. 
4H The distinction has been emphasized primarily by the "definitional balancers," 
who usc the distinction to argue that the First Amendment can be absolute in 
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that are totally outside the First Amendment. Such conduct includes 
not only a wide range of nonverbal conduct, such as killing, maim-
ing, speeding, and polluting, but also some linguistic or pictorial 
conduct, such as verbal betting, price-fixing, acceptance of a con-
tract, extortion, perjury, and hard-core pornography.49 In each of 
these instances the conduct at issue, whether verbal or not, is not 
taken to be speech in the First Amendment sense, and thus First 
Amendment modes of analysis are inappropriate.50 It is more than 
the mere use of words that triggers First Amendment considera-
tions.51 Constitutional law has swallowed enough of the law school 
curriculum as it is without having to encompass almost all of con-
tract and commercial law. 
The key point here is that conduct that is covered is not neces-
sarily protected. Defamatory speech is covered by the First Amend-
ment, but it is not protected if it is false and if it is published either 
negligently, in the case of private individuals, or with knowledge of 
falsity, in the case of public figures and public officials. 52 Speech hav-
ing political content is plainly covered, but it is not protected if it 
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action."53 Nonprurient offensive 
speech is covered by the First Amendment but is not protected when 
terms of protection without being absolute in terms of coverage. See EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM oF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970); Frantz, Tbe First Amendment in tbe 
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Nimmer, Tbe Rigbt to Speak from Times to 
Time: First Amendment Tbeory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MicH. L. REv. 619 (1960). But 
these theories obscure the point that coverage and protection are different even 
if protection is not absolute. The distinction shows us that the governmental burden 
of justification is higher within the First Amendment arena than outside it, but 
it does not command that the burden inside the First Amendment must be in-
surmountable. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 260-61 (1977), in which 
Dworkin describes the same distinction as a distinction between the range of a 
principle (coverage) and the force of a principle (protection). 
49 See Schauer, note 41 supra. 
50 The First Amendment is of course relevant in drawing the line between that 
which is covered and that which is not. This is most apparent in the obscenity cases. 
See Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Counnunity Standards": Tbe Perpetua-
tion of an Irrelevant Concept in tbe Law of Obscenity, 56 N. CAR. L. REv. I (1978). 
51 
"[T]he First Amendment ... cannot have been, and obviously was not, in-
tended to give immunity for every possible use of language." Frohwerk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (Holmes, J.). 
52 Genz v.RobenWelch, Inc.,418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
53 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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broadcast over the airwaves54 nor protected from content-based zon-
ing regulation. 55 Commercial speech is now covered by the First 
Amendment"0 (although it was not under Valentine v. Chresten-
seu),rl1 but it is not protected if false or misleading or deceptive. 58 
Pickering applies this same analytic structure to public speech 
by school teachers. The speech is covered, but it is not protected if 
it can be shown to hamper a close working relationship with an im-
mediate supervisor, if it can be shown to call into question the 
teacher's competence as a scholar or teacher, if it breaches a le-
gitimate interest in confidentiality, or if it is outweighed by any of 
a number of other qualifying factors suggested in Pickering. The 
significance of the Fifth Circuit opinion in Givhan is that it does 
not treat private speech merely as unprotected. It treats it as not 
covered. The First Amendment is not even relevant. The Court of 
Appeals could alternatively have said that private speech was cov-
ered, but that when presented in this manner and under these cir-
cumstances the protection was lost. Indeed, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed such an approach, since it said that the private nature of the 
speech might suggest additional factors in applying the "Pickering 
calculus."uo 
Viewed in this way, the issue is clearly drawn. Is private speech 
the type of communication to which the First Amendment is 
addressed? It is this question to which the Fifth Circuit loudly an-
swered "No" and to which the Supreme Court more loudly an-
swered "Yes." And it is that "Yes" answer that requires more analy-
sis than is afforded in Givhan. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE SPEECH 
A. THE MEANING OF "PRIVATE SPEECH" 
To weigh the protection afforded to private speech, it is neces-
sary to determine precisely what the Court did and did not hold 
&4 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
L~Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
m Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 u.s. 748,762 (1976). 
&7 316 u.s. 50 (1942). 
&s Sec Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and tbe Regulation of Ad-
vertsing, 90 HARY. L. REv. 661 (1977). 
w 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4. 
230 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1979 
in Givhan. It is apparent that the Court did not hold that private 
speech is per se protected by the First Amendment. There is no 
suggestion in Givhan that private speech is more protected than 
public speech. In holding that speaking publicly is not a necessary 
condition for the First Amendment protection, the Court did not 
hold that speaking privately is a sufficient condition. 
Since the Court did not hold that private speech is protected by 
reason of its privacy, it necessarily did not hold that all private 
speech is protected. Those restrictions that are permissible for pub-
lic speech remain permissible for private speech, except in those 
situations where the public nature of the speech provides the justifi-
cation for the restriction, as with public offensiveness or the provo-
cation of an angry crowd. 60 If I approach an individual whom I 
know to be on the verge of committing a political assassination and, 
with the intent of causing that assassination, specifically urge him 
to carry out his plan, then this private speech may be punished just as 
could public counseling of murder in circumstances where it is 
likely that murder will immediately ensue. 
What the Court did hold in Givhan is that private speech is not 
for that reason alone excluded from either the coverage or the pro-
tection of the First Amendment. If a certain form of speech would 
be protected if delivered in print, or to a public audience, then that 
same speech is equally protected if spoken or published in a closed 
office, in a living room, or at a table in a quiet restaurant. This im-
plies that the distinction between public speech and private speech 
is never relevant in First Amendment adjudication, an implication 
that derives much support from the unqualified nature of the Court's 
opinion as well as from the Court's statement that the lack of such 
a distinction is derived directly from the text of the First Amend-
ment. 
Several unexplained distinctions serve to obscure the Court's con-
clusions about private speech. Thus, the public-private distinction 
discussed here is not the same as the distinction between speech that 
is in the public interest and speech that concerns only the private 
personal interests of the speaker or the listener. vVe are not dis-
6° Crowd reaction may be relevant whether the crowd is sympathetic or hostile. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Fcin.er v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 
(I 951). There may not be much left ofF einer. Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); 
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 
(1963). 
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cussing private speech in the sense in which Meiklejohn distin-
guished private speech from public speech.61 The issue here and in 
Givbmz involves the forum and the audience, not the subject mat-
ter. Bessie Givhan's complaints plainly related both to the opera-
tion of the public schools and to race relations in a community in 
which satisfactory race relations were vitally important. However 
narrowly one wishes to define the notion of "speech in the public 
interest," the speech in Givban is undoubtedly included.62 The hold-
ing in Givban does not support the conclusion that the same result 
might have been reached if Bessie Givhan devoted her time in the 
principal's office to spreading rumors about the private behavior 
of mutual acquaintances.63 
Any distinction between public or important speech and private 
or trivial speech may be unworkable.64 There is certainly such a 
suggestion in the rejection of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, bzc.65 by 
Gertz v. Robert TV elcb, Inc.66 But the impact of Gertz on this issue 
is lessened not only by Time, Inc. v. Firestone61 but also by Young 
tll i\IEJKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH A1'.'D ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); 
Meiklejohn, Tbe First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuPREME CouRT REVIEW 
245. For similar distinctions, sec Be Vier, Tbe First Amendment and Political 
Speecb: An Inquiry into tbe Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 
299 (1978); Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
1No.L.J.1 (1971). 
''
2 1ndccd, the firing of Bessie Givhan for complaining may not be all that dis: 
similar to a prosecution for sedition. The ultimate question is the value of loyalty, 
whether to a nation or to an employer. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: 
A Note on "Tbe Cemral ,Ueaning of tbe First Amendment," 1964 SuPREME CoURT 
REVIEW 191. 
ll3 I am not saying that such a distinction could be supported by current doctrine, 
only that Gh:bcm itself stands as no barrier to the adoption or application of this 
type of distinction. 
ct Sec Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speecb and First Amendment Metbod-
ology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915,936 (1978); see also Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. 
L. REV. 891 (1949). 
c:;403 U.S.29 (1971). 66 418U.S.323 (1974). 
117424 U.S. 448 (1976). The import of Time is that at least some degree of le-
gitimate public importance is part of the determination of who is a public figure. It 
is arguably beyond the human capacity to comprehend all of the different ways 
in which the Supreme Court has used the word "public." Since "private" is the 
most obvious antonym for "public," it is not surprising to find the varying use of 
that word as well. 
There is a similar distinction embodied in the "newsworthiness" standard applied 
in actions for invasion of privacy. See Kalven, Tbe Reasonable Man and tbe First 
Amendment: Hill, Butts, and JValker, 1967 SuPREME CoURT REviEW 267, 283. Al-
though the Supreme Court has yet to speak to the constimtionality of a true (as 
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v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.68 "[F]ew of us would march our 
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our 
choice."69 But the theoretical wisdom or practical workability of 
distinctions like this is not at issue here. The subject matter of 
Givhan's speech did pertain to public issues, and this sense of the 
public-private distinction is not what is involved in Givhan. 
Exclusion of the subject-matter sense of "private" still leaves sev-
eral different concepts of private speech. One is the distinction be-
tween face-to-face communication and less personal forms of 
speech. In upholding constitutional protection for client solicita-
tion by lawyers in In re Priums70 and denying such protection in 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,71 the Court drew some sup-
port from the presence of "in-person" solicitation in Obralik, a 
factor absent in Priums. 72 The Court suggests that in-person solicita-
tion might either be less central to the purposes of the First Amend-
ment or at least more susceptible to abuse. But the letter in Obralik 
is also directed to one person only and is as much if not mar~ inac-
cessible to the public at large. Thus it is hard to see how Obralik and 
Primus can tum on a public-private distinction, although in-person 
communication is one of the earmarks of the type of speech at issue 
in Givhan. Mr. Justice Rehnquists's dissent in Primus questions the 
distinction between face-to-face and other forms of communica-
tion, 73 and there may be a relationship between this dissent and his 
opinion in Givhan. But the concurrence of the entire Court in 
Gi-vhan leads to the conclusion that the rejection of the public-
private distinction there leaves the distinction between in-person 
and more distant speech intact. 
Alternatively, private speech may be taken to mean speech di-
rected to only one person, rather than to a group, or to the general 
public, or to anyone who cares to listen. Speech that is private in 
this sense would include both face-to-face communication and a 
opposed to false-light) privacy case, the newsworthiness standard has proYided the 
relevant distinction in most such cases in the lower courts. See, e.g., Briscoe "· 
Reader's Digest Association, 4 Cal .3d 529 (1971). 
68 427U.S.50 (1976). 
69 /d. at 70; see also id. at 61. 
70 436U.S.412 (1978). 
71436 u.s. 447 (1978). 
72 I d. at 464-66. 
73 436 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, ]., dissenting). 
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personal letter, but would exclude a speech to a large audience, a 
mass mailing, or the publication of a book, newspaper, or magazine. 
Such a distinction is suggested by the current formulation of the 
"fighting words" doctrine. 74 The Court has strongly implied that 
the crucial demarcation between regulable fighting words and pro-
tected inflammatory words is the extent to which the former are 
directed at particular individuals. 75 Standing on a platform and pro-
claiming that all police officers are pigs is protected, even if a police 
officer is in the audience.76 But yelling "You're a pig!" to a par-
ticular officer may be the subject of prosecution.77 Although Paul 
Cohen has the right to wear a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the 
Draft,"78 he may not have the right to say "Fuck you!" to a par-
ticular individual. 
To the extent that Givban's rejection of the public-private dis-
tinction can be interpreted as a rejection of a distinction between 
speech directed to the public at large and speech directed at a par-
ticular individual, this aspect of the fighting words cases is called 
into question. This is an issue to which I will return later, since a 
distinguishing principle seems available. 79 There is less question about 
the effect on another area of First Amendment doctrine. The hold-
ing in Givba11 certainly casts grave doubts on the extent to which the 
principles of Gertz v. Robert Welcb, Inc. are limited to publica-
tions by the media. Such a limitation is supported by the Court's re-
peated references to the mass media in the Gertz opinion.80 Anum-
74 Sec, e.g., Gooding v. \:Vilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 
U.S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 
408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plummer v. City 
of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (I 973). The Courr's cryptic decisions in these cases, gen-
erally on overbreadth or vagueness grounds, make it difficult to say whether or 
not there is anything worrhy of dte title "doctrine." See TRIBE, note 33 supra, at 
617-18. 
7
" Gooding v. \:Vi !son, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
711 Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972). 
77 Sec Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St.2d 107 (1974). 
7fl Cohen\', California, 403 U.S.15 (1971). 
70 Sec text infra, at note 103. 
80 See Shitfrin, supra note 64; 9<>1lins & Drushal, Tbe Reaction of tbe State Courts 
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CAsE WEST. RES. L. REv. 306, 328-34 (1978); 
Eaton, Tbe American Law of Defamation tbrougb Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1403-08, 1416-19 (1975); 
Note, First Amendment Protection agaimt Libel Actiom: Distinguisbing Media 
mzd Non-Media Defendants, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 902 (1974) (written before Gertz). 
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ber of lower courts that have been called upon to apply Gertz to 
nonmedia speech have in fact held Gertz inapplicable.81 Recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court negate the notion that Gertz applies 
only to the organized press. 82 A majority of the Court has con-
sistently refused to distinguish between the press and other forms 
of communication, and one can say with a fair degree of confidence 
that this same majority would apply Gertz to public orations as 
well as to printed or broadcast publications. 83 But speech directed 
to a limited number of identified individuals is more problematic. 
What if A tells B that C is having an affair with D's wife? The im-
plication in Givhan is that this is subject to the same protection as 
would obtain if A's charges against C were published in the New 
York Times or announced on the Boston CommonY· The resolu-
tion of this lingering issue in the law of defamation may or may 
not have been the Court's oblique intention, but it is quite likely 
that that is the result. 
A distinction between public speech and private speech may in-
stead (or in addition) be a distinction based on the location of the 
speech. Some speech takes place in cloistered locations, such as living 
rooms or private offices. Other speech is more open, taking place 
in the streets, the parks, or the mass media. The Court does not 
make clear in Gi-vhan whether the speech was private in the sense 
that it was directed only to the principal or in the sense that it was 
made in the principal's closed office. It is likely but not certain that 
the Court rejected both distinctions. 
Both the audience-directed and location-directed notions of 
private speech turn on the concept of who is invited. 85 A meeting 
81 E.g., compare Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis.2d 487 (1975), witb Jacron 
Sales Co. v.Sindorf, 276 Md. 580 (1976). 
82 This conclusion is drawn from the Court's refusal to recognize a distinct 
privilege for the press, often on the grounds that no distinguishing features can be 
developed in any principled manner. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc:, 
438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Sax be"· ·washington Post 
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
83 See Eaton, note 80 supra, at 1406. 
84 It is true that this hypothetical case involves speech that is purely private in 
the subject-matter sense. But there is absolutely no suggestion in Gertz that the 
constitutionalized negligence requirement would not apply to all mass media 
defamation regardless of subject matter. 
85 If I have a conversation with a friend in my living room, it is private in that 
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of the American Bar Association from which the press is excluded 
is in both senses private, although the audience could be large. The 
speaker knows the identity of the audience and can also limit the 
audience. 
This suggests that privacy as used here is a complex rather than a 
simple notion. Its very complexity may suggest a rejection of the 
public-private distinction on pragmatic rather than theoretical 
grounds.86 It is perhaps best to look at private speech in the context 
of a paradigm example. In all senses other than the subject-matter 
sense the truly private speech is a two-person face-to-face conversa-
tion in a private living room closed to everyone except the two 
panicipants. If we can say that this speech is within the First Amend-
ment, then we can say that forms of speech in some sense less 
private are within the First Amendment as well. 
B. THE VALUE OF PRIVATE SPEECH 
Unraveling the different senses of a distinction between public 
speech and private speech helps in understanding the import of 
Gi-vhan and in applying it to other situations. It remains, however, 
to examine the Coun's conclusion that the distinction is not relevant. 
Does speech that is private in some or all senses have less First 
Amendment value? 
A distinction between public speech and private speech in the 
extent of either coverage or protection is least justified under a First 
Amendment theory derived in whole or in pan from some concept 
of democracy or self-government. The Meiklejohn theory is the 
most famous,87 although it is neither the first nor the only anicula-
no one else is invited into my lh·ing room to participate. But if I have the conversa-
tion with the same friend on a bench in a park, the conversation is every bit as 
private e\·cn though the location is in some senses public. But the important fact 
is that the com·ersation is private in either case. It is in all cases restricted to the 
participants, whether by reason of the laws of pri,·atc property or by reason of the 
fact that we will stop talking if anyone comes too close. Aficionados of bad movies 
or television police shows know that if you want to take out a contract on some-
one you do not do it in a prh·ate house; you do it in a public park. Privacy may 
be created by crowds or by anonymity as much as by seclusion. It all depends on 
what you mean by "private," and the Court in Givban docs not tell us what it 
means. 
"
0 Sec Shiffrin, note 64 supra. 
x7 Sec note 61 supra. 
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tion of such a theory.88 Under any such theory it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between speech in public and speech in private. As much as 
we may talk about the public forum, we must not avoid recogniz-
ing that a great deal of political speech takes place outside of the 
public forum. To find the "true" forum for political discussion and 
commentary in this country, we should not journey to the theaters, 
the parks, or the streets, or read newsapers, magazines, placards, 
posters, or billboards. Rather, we must go to the pool halls, the 
factories, the bars, the private offices, the barbershops, and the pro-
verbial living room in Peoria. Although many of these are "public" 
places, they are all locations where particular conversations are 
limited to a known, invited, and usually quite small audience. But 
it is here that politics and public matters are discussed and minds 
are changed. It is here that arguments about politics and personal-
ities take place. 
The public forum is indeed the catalyst for much discussion of 
public matters. But the public forum is not the end of the process. 
The culmination of the process is to be found in the discussion 
among people in much more cloistered settings. The town meeting 
model so stressed by Meiklejohn relies on dialogue and participation. 
To see that process outside of the New England town meeting we 
should look at a forum for discussion and argument, not a forum 
for unilateral speechmaking and passive listening. This forum for 
discussion and argument is much more likely to be limited rather 
than open to all. It may be one sign of a totalitarian society that 
people are imprisoned for what they say in public, especially if they 
are criticizing government, its policies, or its leaders. 80 But the 
ultimate affront to the notion of a free society occurs when people 
are imprisoned for what they say in their living rooms. "\Ve are in 
danger when the informer is one member of a large audience, but 
we are in greater danger when the informer is our next-door 
neighbor. 
From this perspective, we can see that the rejection of the public-
88 See KANT, ON THE Ow SAw: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WoN'T 
WoRK IN PRAcriCE 72 (E. B. Ashton trans. 1974); SPINOZA, TRAcrATUS THEOLOGICO-
Pouncus chap. 20 (1670); Burne, Of tbe Liberty of tbe Press, in EssAYS, MoRAL, 
PoLITICAL AND LITERARY 8 (Oxford ed. 1963); see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 
U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
89 See Kalven, note 69 supra. 
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private distinction is also supported by the "self-expression"90 and 
"catharsis"01 values often said to justify the principles of freedom 
of speech. It may be that free speech theories derived from the con-
cept of the marketplace of ideas,02 or the search for truth,93 or the 
principles of self-government,04 are theories derived from societal 
rather than individual interests.05 They are directed more toward 
the interests of society, and also to the interests of the listeners, than 
they are toward the interests of the speaker. Under such theories 
we protect speakers only instrumentally in the service of these 
broader interests. From this point of view one can imagine grant-
ing less protection to private speech, since the closed setting re-
duces the number of listeners and thereby reduces the impact on 
society at large. But if, instead, we look at free speech as providing 
a catharsis, an outlet for frustration short of violence, then we should 
acknowledge that this may occur as easily with private speech as 
with public speech. 
Similarly, if we look to the value to the speaker of communicat-
ing ideas to others, then the size or location of the audience may 
again be of little importance. Indeed, the value to the speaker may 
be increased as the size of the audience and the openness of the loca-
tion decrease. Although self-expression in general is not a First 
Bo See, e.g., TnmE, note 33 supra at 576-736; Dworkin, Introduction, in DwoRKIN, 
Eo., PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 1, 13-16 (1977); Baker, Scope of tbe First Amendment 
Freedom of Speecb, 25 U.CL.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); Richards, Free Speecb and 
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Tbeory of tbe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. 
REv. 45 (1974). 
01 See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Tbeory of tbe First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1963); LASKI, A GRA;>.IMAR oF PoLITics, 121 (4th ed. 1938). 
02 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
03 MILL, On Liberty, in EssENTIAL WoRKS OF JoHN STUART MILL 268-304 (Lerner 
ed. 1961); MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 78, 126 (Suffolk ed. 1968); LoCKE, A LETTER coN-
CERNING ToLERATION 151 (Gough ed. 1948); Bagehot, Tbe Metapbysical Basis of 
Toleration, in 2 LITERARY STUDIES 422, 425 (Hutton ed., 3d ed., 1884); Jefferson, 
First Inaugural Address, in THE CoMPLETE }EFFERSON 384 (Padover ed. 1943); 
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.); 
See Gunther, Learned Hand and tbe Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: 
Some Fragment)· of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975). 
04 See notes 61 and 86 supra. 
05 On this distinction in the context of freedom of speech, see 3 PoUND, }URIS-
PRUDENCE 63-67,313-17 (1959). 
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Amendment value,96 self-expression by communication has been so 
regarded in numerous opinions of the Supreme Court.97 And so long 
as this value remains as one core of free speech theory, then it fol-
lows that the interests of the speaker are independently deserving 
of First Amendment protection. When we focus on the interests 
of the speaker, it is difficult to say that these interests are necessarily 
diminished by the smallness or seclusion of the audience. 
Moreover, there may be societal or listener interests even where 
there is an individual listener receiving the message other than in 
the public forum. One of the values of freedom of speech is its 
function in helping to correct and challenge accepted beliefs.98 This 
is a value that obtains under both the self-government and market-
place-of-ideas arguments. Here the proper focus is on the identity 
of the listener rather than the number of listeners. Criticism of the 
President of the United States does more than allow the populace 
to remove or fail to reelect an unsatisfactory President. It does more 
than mobilize public opinion in such a way that the President may 
respond with deeds or reply with words. There is a more direct 
argument. Criticism of the President is valuable because the Presi-
dent himself may hear the particular criticism and may as a result 
modify or reject an erroneous policy. 
From this perspective the Free Speech Clause merges with the 
First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances. One of the amicus briefs in Givhan relied as much on 
the right to petition the government as it did on freedom of speech.99 
96 See Schauer, note 41 supra. 
97 See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978); 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.64, 74-75 (1964). 
98 See PoPPER, THE OPEN SociETY AND hs ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). A forceful 
criticism of Mill and Popper is Kendall, Tbe "Open Society" and Its Fallacies, H 
A..~.PoL.Sct.REv.972 (1960). 
99 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Association of University Professors, at 
15-20. See also Brief for Petitioner, at 19 n.14. The relationship between the Free 
Speech Clause and the Petition Clause was suggested by Justice Rutledge in Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,530 (1945). This is particularly interesting here because some 
of the activities in Tbomas could be characterized as "private" solicitation. The 
Court recognized that private solicitation of a single individual might create dif-
ferent issues, id. at 528-29, and used the combination of the Free Speech and Peti-
tion Clauses to suggest that private solicitation would be for one reason or another 
protected by the First Amendment. I d. at 533-34. 
The right to petition plainly encompasses administrative bodies as well as legisla-
tive ones. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
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The argument also has some textual support. Because it is impos-
sible to petition the government for a redress of grievances without 
at the same time speaking, the Petition Clause would be a redun-
dancy if it did not give particular protection for direct criticism of 
public officials, without regard to whether the criticism is made by 
public speech, private letter, or private audience.100 The Free Speech 
Clause protects my right to stand in Lafayette Park and announce 
that the President and his policies are demented. It may be the Peti-
tion Clause that gives me the right to write him a letter containing 
the same message. 
Regardless of whether the source is the Free Speech Clause or the 
Petition Clause, it would certainly be odd if some part of the First 
Amendment101 did not protect the right to criticize a governmental 
official to his face. Private communication with an officer of govern-
ment may in many respects be the most effective way of calling 
that officer to task or pointing out mistakes in judgment that can 
be corrected. The more the Court continues to rely on arguments 
about democracy to support the concept of freedom of speech/02 
the more it can be said that direct criticism of public officials lies 
at the core of First Amendment theory. And, as we increasingly 
identify this as a core free speech value, a blanket exclusion of 
private speech appears ever more anomalous. 
Of course, there may in many instances be advantages in the kind 
of public speech that is directed to a large and possibly anonymous 
510 0972). The Petition Clause has been used on numerous occasions in the lower 
courts to overrurn discharges of complaining employees. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
United States, 428 F.2d 844 (Ct. CI. 1970); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857, 
861 (Ct. Cl. 1967); ]annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974); Los 
Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 455 P.2d 827, 
832 (1969). 
100 Direct communication has frequently been considered to be the special con-
cern of the Petition Clause. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828--29 n.6 (1974); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 302-03 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
101 The Court has frequently relied on the connection between the Free Speech 
and Petition Clauses to hold that conduct is protected by one, the other, or both. 
Sec United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
530-31 ( 1945). 
102 Sec Brennan, Tbe Supreme Court and tbe Meiklejo/m Interpretation of tbe 
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I (1965); Polsby, Buckley v. Valco: Tbe 
Speci.Tl Nature of Political Speecb, 1976 SuPREME CouRT REviEW 1. 
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group. It is a mistake to assume that there is only one core to First 
Amendment theory. Freedom of speech is more properly regarded 
as a bundle of different but interrelated concepts, joined together 
under the oversimplifying rubric of "freedom of speech." One core 
value of the First Amendment is personal or face-to-face criticism 
of public officials. But this does not exclude as another core value the 
right to stand in the public forum, or the right to publish criticism 
of government for public consumption. The soapbox, the parade, 
the demonstration, the newspaper, the book, and the magazine all 
occupy special places in our society, places recognized as special 
by contemporary First Amendment doctrine. These are all forms 
of "mass" speech, and their effectiveness increase in direct propor-
tion to the size of the audience. 
To the extent that free speech is a societal rather than an indi-
vidual interest, forms of speech that reach large segments of society 
may have advantages not possessed by speech that is private in 
the sense now under discussion. But merely because public speech 
is in some respects more important than private speech does not 
mean that in other respects private speech may not be equally if not 
more important. As long as we realize that free speech is more than 
one concept, these two positions are not inconsistent. Since the 
value of public speech may be derived in large part from the private 
speech that it provokes and fosters, a theory that places public 
speech above private speech in the First Amendment hierarchy is 
on shaky ground indeed. 
The foregoing lends support to the conclusion that the Court 
was correct in saying that the private context of the speech did not 
dispose of Gi-vhan (and this is all the Court decided) and to the 
corollary conclusion that Gertz cannot be limited to the mass media. 
But what then of the .fighting words cases, where a similar distinc-
tion seems established? The answer seems to come from an exami-
nation of the other side of the First Amendment question. On the 
one hand, we look at the value of the particular speech or at the 
value of a particular category of speech. But on the other hand, 
we look at the justifications for the asserted restriction. In develop-
ing categories and approaches to First Amendment analysis, we 
look at the interests in regulation as well as the interests in free 
speech. From this vantage point we see in Ohralik the interest in 
preventing potentially coercive and misleading solicitation. In many 
cases we look at the interests in public order and safety that justify 
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content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.103 In the fight-
ing words case we look at the interest in preventing "idea-less" 
provocation.104 
In all of these situations it is the context of speech that governs 
its regulability. The justification for regulation in these and other 
situations depends on the context in which the speech exists. This 
is not the place to analyze each instance of permissible regulation 
of speech in which the extent of that permission varies with the con-
text. The important point is that there are such instances, although 
they do not exhaust the category of permissible restrictions.105 In 
those instances in which context is established as being the relevant 
or dispositive factor it would be foolish to say that context may be 
considered but that the public or private nature must be ignored. 
The location of the speech may very well give the speech the impact 
that justifies its regulation. So too with the size of the audience. 
In the fighting words cases the "privateness" increases the impact of 
the very factor that justifies the regulation. Private verbal assaults 
are more likely to provoke violent reactions.106 The distinction be-
tween public speech and private speech may indeed be relevant in 
determining the extent of protection where the principles that per-
mit regulation would, without the public-private distinction, allow 
a consideration of context. The private context, as has been seen, 
cannot create the justification. But where the principles of regula-
tion lead us to context, the location of the speech and the identity of 
the audience are factors to be considered. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the Court's observation that under some circumstances 
the setting may be relevant to the "Pickering calculus,"107 but the 
principles extend far beyond Pickering alone. 
In some instances of regulation justified by context the private 
103 See, e.g., KO\•acs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
U.S.569 (1941). 
104 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
10
:; Permissible restrictions on defamatory speech, e.g., are largely independent 
of context. 
Ir•J The more the speec:h is directed at a particular individual, the more he is 
likely ro react violently. But it is possible that, once the speech is directed at a par-
ticular individual, the likelihood of violent reaction increases with the number 
of observers. Part of the cause of violent reaction may very well be humiliation, 
which requires an audience. 
107 99 S. Cr. ar 696 n.4. 
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setting may argue for increased protection. This may be the case 
in Givhan, for the private audience may produce better results with 
fewer unpleasant side effects. And in Pickering the Court suggested 
that under some circumstances a teacher might be required to make 
a complaint internally before going public with the complaint.108 
But instances also exist where it is possible that the private setting 
may decrease the available protection. Fighting words again seem 
the best example. 
With this vital qualification regarding context, we can both jus-
tify and qualify the holding in Givhan. The private setting alone 
does n:ot result in forfeiture of First Amendment coverage or pro-
tection, but the private setting is indeed relevant to the extent of 
protection where the extent of protection is to be determined by the 
context of the utterance at issue. 
III. THE PRIVATE CITIZEN AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
We have seen several senses of the public-private distinction, 
one in terms of subject matter, another in terms of the forum, and 
a third in terms of the audience. But there is still another sense, one 
that leads to a consideration of the other important facet of Givhan. 
For Bessie Givhan was not only a private citizen; she was also a 
public employee. Pickering was decided in large part in reliance on 
the fact that Pickering was speaking out not as a public employee 
but as a private citizen.109 The same is true of both the situation 
and the Court's opinions in Perry,110 in Mt. Healthy,111 and in City 
of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. ·wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission.112 In all of these cases it could as easily have 
been a private citizen not employed by the State who was speaking. 
These cases leave undecided the extent of free speech protection 
where the individual speaks not qua citizen but qua public employee. 
Givhan is far from illuminating on this issue, but it provides some 
signposts for exploring this difficult constitutional terrain. 
The cases before Givhan all involve speech in forums open to the 
108 391 U.S. at 572 n.4. 
109 !d. at 574, noting that the employment "is only tangentially and insubstantially 
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher." 
110 408 U.S. at 598. 
111 429U.S.at282. 112 429U.S.l67 (1976). 
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general public. In each case the Court took pains to point out that 
it was the teacher as citizen that provided the focal point of the anal-
ysis. "He addressed the school board not merely as one of its em-
ployees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views 
on an important decision of his government."113 This language 
would clearly have been controlling in Givhan if Bessie Givhan's 
complaints about racial discrimination in the schools had been ex-
pressed in a letter to the editor of a local newspaper, in a speech in 
a public park, or at a board of education meeting open to the gen-
eral public.114 But by expressing her complaints in the principal's 
office, she utilized a forum not open to the general public. It was 
open to her solely by virtue of her employment as a teacher. 
\Vhen a teacher or other public employee speaks out as a teacher, 
or as a public employee, additional considerations come into play, 
some of which were suggested in Pickering.115 The speech may 
jeopardize a necessarily close working relationship, it may breach 
a valid interest in confidentiality, or it may call into question a 
teacher's very fitness for the position. I have the right to believe that 
the world is flat or that astrology tells us more than the theories of 
Newton and Einstein. I also have the right to express these views to 
anyone foolish enough to listen. But if I am the head of the physics 
department at a major state research university, I can hardly deny 
that such public utterances might validly cause my superiors to 
wonder if perhaps I am in the wrong line of work and to take ap-
propriate action. As a citizen I have the right to interest myself in 
and comment upon the fortunes of the New Y ark Yankees. But 
as a teacher of constitutional law I do not have the right to devote 
my entire course in constitutional law to evaluating the perform-
ances of Reggie Jackson and Ron Guidry in the 197 8 World Series. 
It is this latter situation that more closely relates to the facts in 
Givban. Bessie Givhan was not only speaking out as a teacher, she 
113 /J. at 174-75. 
1H In City of Madison it was the fact that the meeting was open to the public 
rather than a closed bargaining session that was determinative. Ibid. 
115 
"At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an em-
ployer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those 
it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 
The problem in any case is to arriYe at a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as citizen, in commentinl? upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, m promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees." 391 U.S. at 568. 
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was speaking out on her employer's premises and on her employer's 
time. Regardless of whether a modem-day McAuliffe might have 
the right to talk politics on his own time, 116 it is clear that he 
could be legitimately dismissed for delivering a political oration 
when he was supposed to be directing traffic. 
Transposing this to the academic setting, we can see that virtually 
all of the Supreme Court's references to academic freedom have 
been little more than excess verbiage. In the most prominent "aca-
demic freedom" cases, from Keyishian v. Board of Regems117 and 
vVieman ·v. Updegraff118 to Pickering and Perry, the speech rook 
place outside of the school and on the teacher's own time. These 
are not academic freedom cases-they are free speech cases. The is-
sue is only whether a public employee can be penalized for exercis-
ing a citizen's right of free speech. The full application of the prin-
ciple in these cases to public employees who are not teachers 
demonstrates that the principle is only that dismissal from public em-
ployment is just one of many impermissible penalties on protected 
speech. m If it is academic freedom that protects a teacher's right 
to join an organization, or speak out in public, then one who is not 
an academic has no claim to such rights. Surely this is not true. 
Pickering's right to criticize the school board is no greater than the 
streetcleaner's right to criticize the sanitation department.120 
116 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892) (Holmes, J.). 
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con-
stitutional right to be a policeman." ld. at 220. The accepted wisdom is that 
McAuliffe is the prototypical example of the now discredited right-privilege distinc-
tion. See Van Alstyne, Tbe Demise of tbe Rigbt-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tirmal Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). But McAuliffe might not necess:1rily be 
decided differently today. See Civil Service Commission v. National Association 
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 
75 (1947). 
117 385 u.s. 589 (1967). 
118 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 
1961 Wis. L. REv. 3; Jones, Tbe American Concept of Academic Freedom, in 
JouGHIN, ED., AcADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 224 (1967); .i'vlurphy, Academic 
Freedom-an Emerging Constitutional Rigbt, 28 L. & CoNT. PRoB. 447 (1963); V:1n 
Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of Teacbers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J. 841; 
Wright, Tbe Constitution on tbe Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969); Schauer, 
Scbool Books, Lesson Plans, and tbe Constitution, 78 W.VA. L. REv. 287 (1976). 
119 See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: TVelfare Benefits witb Strings At-
tacbed, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of 
Employees: A Comment on tbe Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 751 (1969). 
120 On applications of Pickering to nonacademic positions, sec, e.g., Don:1hue 
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Talk of academic freedom is therefore pointless unless there is 
something about academic freedom that is special or different. Aca-
demic freedom is a meaningful concept only if it protects activities 
not otherwise protected by the general concept of free speech.121 
Unless academic freedom adds something to freedom of speech its 
deployment serves only to confuse the analysis. 
lf there is an independent concept of academic freedom, it is 
surely derived not only from the First Amendment, in general, but 
also from the doctrine of freedom of speech, in particular. Yet this 
does not mean that the two are the same. The values of the intel-
lectual marketplace and of open inquiry into even the most accepted 
beliefs are arguably served in a special way within the setting of an 
academic institution. It can also be said that the academic institu-
tion has a special responsibility to instill the spirit of inquiry that 
enables the general notion of free speech to function. If this is true, 
then the First Amendment may generate a distinct institutional pro-
tection for the academy. 
Drawing this distinction makes it possible to see Givhan in a dif-
ferent light. Prior to Givhan there had been only one "true" aca-
demic freedom case in the Supreme Court, Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire.122 vVithout the concept of academic freedom there is nowhere 
in constitutional law an exception to the principle that during work-
ing hours employees are to do what their employers tell them to 
do. But in Sr..veezy the Court suggested that activities in the class-
room might be protected, a seeming exception to this general prin-
ciple. After Sweezy, the State as employer is to some extent limited 
in the extent to which it can mandate what the university teacher 
as employee can do in the classroom. But this is a somewhat obscure 
v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972) (chaplain at mental hospital); Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania ex rei. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. 
Supp. 500 <E.D. Pa. 1973) (psychiatric nurse); )annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th 
Cir. 1974) (fireman). In Rafferty the court suggested that, if the plaintiff's superiors 
in the community mental health center were that sensitive to criticism, they perhaps 
ought to be the patients rather than the supervisors. 
121 By far the best exposition of this distinction is Van Alstyne, Tbe Specific 
Tbeory of Academic Freedom and tbe General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 ANNALS 
140 (1972). 
122 3H U.S. 234 (1957), in which a state investigation into a lecture delivered 
in a class at the University of New Hampshire was held invalid. Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), involved classroom activity, but the case was decided 
on establishment of religion grounds. Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence did sug-
gest a possible academic freedom-free speech path to the same result. Id. at 116. 
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dictum in Sweezy, and there has been little more guidance from 
the Supreme Court.123 
The paucity of precedent has not deterred the proliferation of 
an extensive literature on this subject.124 There have been several 
notable lower court cases, most prominently Judge Johnson's opin-
ion in Parducci v. Rutland.125 But the Supreme Court has said very 
little about the extent to which either academic freedom or freedom 
of speech protects utterances on school time and on school property. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Coumnmity Scbool Dis-
trict/26 the Court said that " [ i] t can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"127 but the Court there 
did little more than protect only those exercises of constitutiol}al 
rights that are not inconsistent with the educational function. It 
said nothing about whether freedom of speech is part of the educa-
tional function. 
To answer this question it is necessary to look closely at the edu-
cational process. This is a task that is not manageable here and 
would be quite far afield from what can be gleaned from Givban. 
There is also the independent and equally difficult question whether 
the recognition of such a distinct institutional right can be found 
in the First Amendment and, also, whether its recognition would be 
123 Two additional cases are helpful. In Healy Y. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 
(1972), it was suggested that the classroom was a marketplace of ideas. And in 
Regents of the University of California Y. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), i\lr. Justice 
Powell talked of academic freedom: "Academic freedom, though not a specifically 
enumerated constitutional right, long has been Yiewed as a special concern of the 
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body." 438 U.S. at 312. Since the 
selection of students is not speech, Mr. Justice Powell's opinion goes a long way 
toward recognizing that academic freedom protects acth·ities not otherwise pro-
tected by the concept of free speech. 
124 In addition to the authorities cited at note 118 supra, see Goldstein, Tbe As-
serted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine TVbat Tbey 
Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expressiou 
withiu the Classroom: A Search for Staudards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, 
Coutroversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expres-
sion, 39 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1032 (1971); Note, Academic Freedom i11 tbe Public 
Schools: The Right to Teacb, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176 (1973). 
125 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See also Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 
(1st Cir. 1969); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448 
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
126 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 127 /d. at 506. 
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consistent with the Court's rejection of independent institutional 
rights for the organized press.128 But if there is such an independent 
concept of academic freedom, a freedom to teach or to choose class 
materials, it arguably varies with the type and level of education 
involved.12° For central to the recognition of classroom academic 
freedom is acceptance of the classroom as more of a public forum 
than a state-controlled agency for indoctrination. It is not at all un-
reasonable to suggest that the classroom shifts from indoctrinative to 
exploratory with the increasing age and sophistication of the stu-
dents. 
But Givhan is not a classroom case. It must not be read to suggest 
that Bessie Givhan's complaints are to be tolerated if she uses the 
classroom rather than the principal's office as the forum for her 
grievances. Givhan is the intermediate case, dealing with speech 
out of the classroom but in the school and on school time.130 In hold-
ing that this was indeed a forum for speech activities, the Court 
goes at least pan of the way toward recognizing an independent 
concept of academic freedom. Albeit obliquely, it suggests as well 
that the internal critic has a constitutionally protected position. 
Various theories might support these conclusions. First, there is · 
the very real problem in government that critics may be singled 
out for especially unfavorable treatment. In protecting the internal 
critic, the gadfly, the Court partially commits itself to a philosophy 
of workplace democracy. Harmony, uniformity, and obedience 
may not be the only important values in public employment. The 
marketplace of ideas is moved from the public forum into the work-
ing environment and the employment relationship. This is again 
quite far from most of the commonly accepted core principles of 
freedom of speech. But as a question of policy there is much to 
commend such a theory. If our assumptions about the value of 
criticism and the value of free interchange of ideas are justified, then 
those assumptions apply with special force to those, such as em-
1~' Sec notes 42 and 82 supra. 
12° Compare De1.•e/opmems in tbe Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 
101-5, 1053 (1968); Schauer, note 118 supra; and Goldstein, note 124 supra, witb 
Note, note 12+ supra, and Le Clerscq, Tbe Monkey Laws and tbe Public Scbools: 
A Seco11d Cmmmzption, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209,235 (1974). 
13° For such intermediate cases, sec, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 
1972); \Vhitscl "·Southeast Local School District, 48f F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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ployees, who have a particular expertise and a particular concern 
with the matters at hand. Reference to this special expertise is found 
in Pickering as wel1.131 But let there be no mistake. The constitution-
alization of the workplace makes it clear, as the procedural due 
process cases had done earlier, that public employment and private 
employment are becoming increasingly dissimilar. 
This constitutionalized openness may inure to the benefit of the 
public in several ways. Not only may it be said that the public bene-
fits when institutions are structured on more open lines, but the 
public may also benefit more directly when public employees can 
inform the electorate about the business of their agencies without 
necessarily proceeding through cumbersome and hierarchical griev-
ance structures. By strongly intimating in Givban that the public 
employee has free speech rights qua public employee, the Court 
takes the first step toward constitutional protection for the "whistle-
blower," an increasingly common phenomenon in American pub-
lic life.132 
Finally, Givban may say something special about schools. Pos-
sibly much of the foregoing applies only or with stronger force in 
schools, rather than in public employment generally. When Dwight 
Eisenhower was president of Columbia University, he addressed the 
faculty as "employees of the university," only to be interrupted by 
a senior faculty member who observed that "We are not emplo'yees 
of this university. We are this university."133 This may strike a 
responsive chord in those who have witnessed the increasing bureau-
cracy and hierarchical structure of the American university. The 
extent to which openness and internal criticism are as valuable in 
primary and secondary schools as they are in the university is very 
possibly a quite different matter. The Court, however, may be 
spealr.ing in more general terms. One may infer from Givban the 
view that schools are to a degree special, that traditional organization 
charts and hierarchical structures may be inconsistent with the 
131 391 U.S. at 571-72. 
132 See Comment, Govenmzent Employee Disclosures of Agency ·wrongdoing: 
Protecting the Right to Blow tbe Wbistle, 42 U. CHr. L. REv. 530 (1975); The 
TVbistleblowers, a Report on Federal Employees Wbo Disclose Acts of Govern-
mental VVaste, Abuse, and Cormption, prepared for Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1978); GovERNMENT AccoUNTABILITY 
PROJEcr, A WHISTLEBLOWER's GuiDE TO THE FEDERAL BuREAUCRACY (1977). 
133 ADAMS, THE ACADEMIC TRIBES 15 (1976). 
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openness that some consider inherent in the processes of educa-
tion and academic inquiry. This is undoubtedly quite far afield from 
what is directly found in the opinion in Givhan. Yet if these observa-
tions about the implications of Givhan are correct, the Court may 
have taken the first step toward recognizing academic freedom as 
a principle and not a platitude. But, like the issue of public speech 
and private speech, the Court tells us little and leaves much for 
speculation. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
On closer analysis, the opinion in Givhan, in rejecting the 
distinction between public speech and private speech, and in further 
extending free speech principles within the walls of the school-
house, has much to commend it. But the implications of Givhan 
are considerable, and the opinion raises more questions than it an-
swers. The opinion is, thus, both too clear and too obscure. A reading 
of the opinion may lead lower courts to ignore the extent to which 
the public-private distinction remains relevant in applying certain 
accepted justifications for restricting speech. In this sense the words 
say too much. On the other hand, a reading of Givhan may lead 
lower courts to underestimate its effect on the issue of academic 
freedom and on the issue of freedom of speech in the academic 
setting. On both the issue of private speech and the issue of speech 
in the schools much more remains to be said. We can do little more 
than guess as to the extent to which the Court will follow the im-
plications of Givhan. It is a pity that the brevity of the opinion 
leaves so much to speculation. 

